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84 LEGIS ACTIONES 
LEGISLATION. [This entry contains three suben-
tries, on legislation in ancient Greece, in English common 
law, and in medieval and post-medieval Roman law. For 
discussion o{ legislation in Chinese law, see Chinese Law, 
Sources of For discussion o{ legislation in Islamic law, {or 
the classical period see Legal Nonns in Islamic Law, 
Production o{; (or the modern period, see Codes and 
Codification, subentries on Islamic Law.] 
Ancient Greece 
The Greek states developed legislative techniques that 
have served as a model for many modern democracies. 
The legislative process, its impetus and goals, changed sig-
nificantly from the seventh to the first century B.C.E. , begin-
ning with the introduction of written sources and ending 
with total subjugation to Roman rule. This time span can 
be divided into three periods based on the states' political 
structure. Their systems did not develop simultaneously 
throughout the Greek world, but overlapped chronologi-
cally. They were the Archaic polis; the classical polis and 
its alternatives; and the Hellenistic states. It is important 
to note also that the classical legislative process outlived 
the Hellenistic era on a local level and lasted long into 
Roman times. 
The Archaie Polis. The logical place to begin a history 
of legislation is with the first written reference to legal 
proceedings. Some would cite Homer's epics as such a 
source. These do not, however, provide proof that there 
was a process in pi ace in the second half of the eighth 
century B.C.E. for issuing generally binding norms. The 
necessary political establishment, the meeting place 
(agora), was indeed already in existence. Citizens and 
political authorities would later convene the Assembly 
there. At this time, however, law was not yet "made." 
Instead divine predeterminations were "discovered," as 
they had been for ages. 
Legislative activity was first recorded at the end of the 
seventh century. Specific measures or a group of measures 
enacted by a polis were inscribed on stone or bronze. 
Codification was not systematic at this time, however, 
even though classical literary sources create this impres-
sion. Reinhard Koerner has compiled, translated into 
German, and commented on the surviving Archaic legal 
inscriptions. Henri van Effenterre and Fran~oise Ruze 
have created a similar compilation in French, with numer-
ous figures of Archaic stone inscriptions. 
The Archaic texts seldom contain information about the 
process of legislation. No fixed format had yet developed, 
but many legal inscriptions begin with an invocation to 
the gods. Apreface usually follows which states that the 
citizens of a certain city have passed the following resolu-
tion. Often, one or both of these parts are missing. At the 
end of the text, there is sometimes an order to record the 
resolution in stone. Occasionally the text states that 
the decision was made in the Assembly, but the decision-
making process remains a mystery. Also, some specific 
norms have survived that were drawn up by individual 
legislators (nomothetai) appointed in times of crisis. 
The Classical Polis. Athenian democracy marked a 
high point in the development of the legislative process. 
Athens. Direct democracy was practiced in the city-state 
of Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E. All citi-
zens played a direct role in the legislative, executive, and 
judicial processes or could take part in them on a regular 
basis. The sovereign was the people, or demos. Resolutions 
were made by vote of the Assembly (ekklesia), in which all 
male citizens above the age of eighteen were allowed to 
take part. There were probably no more than 35,000 
eligible males, and an assembly of six thousand consti-
tuted a quorum. 
The meeting place was eventually relocated from the 
marketplace (agora) to the neighboring hill, the Pnyx, 
. and built to accommodate fifteen thousand. Achairman 
(epistates) presided, who-in the fifth and fourth 
centuries-'-was drawn by lot from the members of the 
Council (boule). As a rule, the Assembly could only act in 
tandem with the Council. The Council was made up of 
five hundred members chosen by lot, fifty from each of 
ten tribes (phylai) that encompassed the entire citizenry. 
This system of numerous drawings by lot guaranteed that 
no individual or group could dominate both political bod-
ies at once. 
Two main principles regulated the decision-making pro-
cess: First, every citizen could bring a proposal to the 
Assembly; second, however, every proposal must first be 
discussed and agreed upon in the Council, at wh ich time it 
was formulated as a preliminary resolution (probouleuma). 
So when a citizen made a proposal in the Assembly, it would 
not be voted on immediately but referred to the Council. 
Citizens and magistrates had the option of submitting pro-
pos als directly to the Council for review. Members of the 
Council also had the right to submit proposals. 
Antityranny Law of Eucrates. Marble stele with arelief 
showing Democracy crowning the Demos (people) of Athens, 
c. 337-336 B.C.E. The inscription is an Athenian law against 
tyranny. PHOTO GRAPH BY lOHN Hros. AKG-IMAGES 
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Sometimes proposals would be drafted into aresolution 
on which the Assembly could vote straightaway. Other 
times, drafting would be left subject to the debate in the 
Assembly. Once the Assembly voted on the final draft of a 
probouleuma, it would immediately carry the force of law. 
The preface to the resulting law reveals the process of leg-
islation: in most cases, it reads "Resolution of the Council 
and the People." Only in rare cases did one of the bodies 
decide alone. Following these words are listed the tribe 
(phyle) in charge of Council business, the chairman of the 
Assembly, the magistrate after whom the year was named, 
the citizen who submitted the proposal. and the recording 
secretary. 
All resolutions passed by the Assembly were enacted 
through this type of process. It addressed daily adminis-
trative odds and ends in the same way as fundamental 
policy change. In the years after 404/403 B.C.E. the year of 
the restoration of democracy after the Peloponnesian war, 
however, a new process called nomothesia (lit. "laying 
down the law") was introduced to differentiate general 
laws (nomoi) from specific decrees (psephismata). During 
the annual examination of the entire law code (or at any 
other time) any citizen could request that for a specific 
matter a body of 501 citizens be selected by lot from a list 
of jurymen to act as legislators (nomothetai). They would 
draft legislation through debate and could ratify it with a 
simple majority without the Assembly being involved 
again. The existing law would be defended by syndikoi, a 
group of four advocates chosen by the Assembly. The 
nomothetai thus functioned like a court. 
Compared to the hundreds of surviving Athenian 
decrees, the number of known laws enacted by the nomoth-
esia procedure-nine-seems rather modest. Curiously, 
this legislation is highly specialized, as detailed by Ronald 
Stroud, covering the following topics: silver coinage, the 
grain tax, public finance, Eleusinian first-fruits, rebuild-
ing the city walls, tyranny, the Panathenaic festival, offer-
ings, and the sanctuary of Artemis at Brauron. 
The priority of a nomos over an ordinary psephisma is 
evident from the fact that the proposer of a psephisma that 
contradicted an existing law was subject to public prose-
cution by a change called graphe paranomön. Even a law 
enacted by the nomothesia process could be prosecuted as 
"inappropriate." These checks on the legislative system 
stern from the protections built into the restored democ-
racy after the events of 404/403 B.C.E. 
Other poleis: democracy or oligarchy. The 1997 collec-
tion by Rhodes and Lewis is the best source for the legisla-
ti on of the· classical poleis. The interaction between the 
magistrates (including the Council) and the Assembly is 
typical of all Greek poleis. However, not all cities granted 
every citizen access to the offices and the Assembly, as 
democratic Athens and its allies did. Athens's allies, such 
as Erythrai and the other states of the first Delian League 
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(478-404 B.C.E.), implemented democratic constitutions in 
which legislation was enacted by "the Council and the 
People" even if not all the subtleties and checks of the 
Athenian system were adopted. 
Oligarchy, in which just a few citizens held full political 
rights, was the older form of government of the Greek polis. 
Legislation was in the hands of a small group, and the leg-
islative process differed from that of a democracy. Athens 
still had an oligarchie constitution during Solon's era (c. 
600 B.C. E.). Athens's adversary, Sparta, remained an oligar-
chy into classical times. In Sparta, the assembly (apella) 
was originally convened by the two kings. They presented 
proposals that had been reviewed in advance by the council 
of elders (gerousia) . Only the kings and magistrates had the 
right to speak in the apella. At the end of the debate, the 
people indicated agreement or disagreement by shouting. If 
it were not dear which group was the loudest, the chairman 
would divide the people into opposite sides. In older times, 
kings were not bound by "false resolutions" ("crooked" 
rhetra). As the heads of state, they retained sovereignty. 
The other oligarchies-which for the most part allied 
themselves with Sparta against Athens in the fifth cen-
tury-possessed basically the same legislative bodies as 
the democracies. The powers of the magistrates, however, 
were greater and the number of citizens (who were called 
to vote based on a census of wealth) was smaller. So there 
was little difference in legislative practice between a mod-
erate democracy and a moderate oligarchy. This made it 
easy for some states to change sides. 
States not organized as poleis. The polis as a form of 
political organization did not appear simultaneously 
throughout Greece. Vestiges of the old tribai organization 
survived for varying lengths of time in the vast agricul-
tural areas of northern Greece (Thessaly, Boeotia, and 
Elis) and on the island of Euboea, where an aristocratic 
dass of knights held political control. 
The most is known about Boeotia. In 446-386 B.C.E. only 
half of the free citizenry-those in the census group of 
hoplites or heavily armed foot soldiers-enjoyed full polit-
ical rights. Every full member belonged to one of four 
councils, which together made up the state. Yet only one 
council (in rotation) held office at a time and was empow-
ered to pass resolutions. For larger issues, however, such 
as those of war and peace, all four councils met and passed 
resolutions based on the prior review of the current gov-
erning council. 
In 379 Thebes, a democratic polis and the most promi-
nent city of Boeotia, formed the Boeotian Confederacy, 
established with a democratic legislative process. It 
defeated Sparta' in 371. Macedonia imposed an oligarchy 
in Thebes in 338, but Alexander the Great eventually 
destroyed the defiant city in 335. 
The Hellenistic States. The legislative and public deci-
sion-making process that developed in dassical Athens 
soon enjoyed high esteem throughout Greece, as seen in 
the example of Thebes. Even Alexander the Great, who 
favored oligarchy, established democracy in the Greek cit-
ies he freed from the Persians. The legislative process in 
these cities, however, was different [rom that of the dassi-
cal democracy in two respects. First, wealthy citizens 
could gain disproportionale political influence through 
philanthropy and personal contacts with the Macedonian 
rulers. Second, in addition to this inner erosion of democ-
racy, under the Hellenistic leaders the powers of the legis-
lative assembly in external matters were limited. Legislation 
only concerned the city's internal affairs. What has sur-
vived is hundreds of inscriplions of honorary decrees 
awarding single persons that were formally ratified by the 
assembly as though they were general norms. These have 
been compiled, along with other material, by Luigi 
Moretti. 
The legislative process had basically been transferred to 
the kings, who ruled through directives (diagrammata) 
that often took the form of a letter to the cities. The text of 
such a letter would be ratified by the assembly of the citi-
zenry and inscribed in stone as law (these texts have been 
collected by Bradford Welles) . In addition to general dia-
grammata , a king could also issue a specific decree in the 
form of a prostagma. Numerous examples from Ptolemaic 
times have been preserved in Egyptian papyri (and col-
lected by Marie-Therese Lenger). 
Even in their native Greece, the poleis lost the power to 
legislate in external affairs, although the legislative process 
itself remained more or less democratic. Following the 
example of the old tri baI states, the poleis of various terri-
tories (Arcadia, Aetolia, and Achaia) formed koina or 
leagues. The member states as well as the league itself 
(which handled foreign relations and coinage) had legisla-
tive power. At first, a koinon had the same legislative bod-
ies as a polis: magistrates, a counci!, and an assembly 
consisting of all the citizens of the member states. As time 
passed, however, legislative power shifted to the counci!, 
which was populated proportionally according to the 
political importance of the member states. The traditional 
function of the council was then taken over by a group of 
officers. Thus a representative democracy was formed 
(with regard to legislative power). Only rarely was an 
assembly of all citizens held. When this did happen, they 
voted on a single, important issue, as in a modern 
referendum. 
[See also Ancient Greek Law, subentry on The Archaic 
Period; Codes and Codification, subentry on Ancient Greek 
Law; and Gortyn.] 
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402 PROCEDURE: Archaic Greek Law 
Athens: An Overview 
Legal procedure in Athens was different from any modem 
system. This article describes the regulations Athenians 
applied in this .field of their private and public lives. The 
Athenian concept of procedure cannot be understood by 
forcing it into the legal framework and ideology of juris-
diction in a modem state. After describing the legal frame-
work, this overview will consider the modes of thought 
behind them. For practical reasons the article concentrates 
on Athenian law, not on Greek law in general. Only for 
Athens and only from the end of the fifth to the fourth cen-
turies B.C.E. are our sources sufficient to sketch the whole 
system of legal procedure and its social background. 
Because our main source is the corpus of the ten Attic ora-
tors, this period is often called "the period of the orators." 
In addition to these sources, contemporary Athenian lit-
erature and excerpts from court speeches now lost, but 
partially preserved by later lexicographers, are of sup-
plementary help. A few statutes and verdicts inscribed 
on stone provide additional evidence. For other Greek 
poleis, scattered stone inscriptions are the only sources. 
Sometimes these help explain unclear Athenian texts. 
This overview begins with general remarks on legal 
characteristics and types of procedure and then provides 
a more specific summary of actions. Some thoughts on 
the social context of procedure conclude the article. The 
first two sections are based mainly on Harrison (1971), 
MacDowell (1978), and Todd (1993); see also Thür (2000). 
The fundamental work of Lipsius (1905-1915) is still use-
ful as a comprehensive collection of literary sources 
though out of date in its conclusions. For the third sec-
tion, the main references are Cohen (1995), Scafuro 
(1997), and Johnstone (1999). 
Legal Characteristics and Types of Procedure. In the 
eyes of Athenians process at law normally meant a trial 
before a Court of the People (dikastenon) comprising 201 
to 2,501 citizens chosen by lot for every court day (see 
Courts, Ancient Greek, subentry on Courts and Magistrates 
in Ancient Athens; and Procedure, subentry on Trial 
Procedure in Ancient Athens). 
Classificationof procedures. Unlike Romans, Athenians 
did not trust individual private judges. Magistrates could 
render definitive sentences only in lawsuits for petty sums. 
At the dikastmon every lawsuit was a contest (agön) fought 
by equallitigants according to strict formal rules (see sub-
entry on Trial Procedure in Ancient Athens). Only private 
persons acted as plaintiffs and defendants. They had to 
appear and plead in person, though unpaid supporting 
speakers, synegoroi, were allowed (Rubinstein, 2000). If 
magistrates were involved on either side, they had no spe-
cial privileges, and there were no public prosecutors. 
Athenians thus had essentially only one type of procedure, 
a contest fought with equal weapons before an audience 
of hundreds or thousands of fellow citizens. Any further 
classification has to keep this fundamental point in mind. 
To avoid the problems arising from the confusion of 
procedural and substantive law-and in particular to 
avoid the mistake made by Lipsius (1905-1915), who con-
fused substantive and formal law and viewed both in an 
anachronistic way-it is safer to rely on strictly formal 
criteria. The most obvious criterion is the formal distinc-
tion between "private" and "public" lawsuits, not in the 
modern sense, but as Athenians understood them (cf. 
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Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians 67.1). In Greek 
terms it is the distinction between dikai and graphai. 
A private dike (lit. action, lawsuit; verdict, punishment) 
could be initiated only by a person who suffered sorne 
wrong by the defendant, ranging from financial damage 
(dike blabes) to revenge for a murdered relative (dike pho-
nou) . A graphe (lit. writing) was public in the sense that 
any person qualified to plead could sue a wrongdoer who 
violated a law providing for such a prosecution. Normally 
the offenses were against the state and public interests, 
but some graphai also protected private persons. Essential 
to the graphe was that a volunteer prosecutor or plaintiff 
(boulomenos, lit. someone willing) could initate an action. 
Other procedures too could be initiated by a boulomenos 
in public lawsuits, generally in cases of offenses against 
the state (see below). Private and public actions (dikai and 
graphai) had in common that claimants and defendants 
opposed each other, and the lawsuits were thus adversar-
ial in nature. Separate from these procedures were others 
called diadikasiai (lit. suits among claimants), which we 
might call "interpleader" cases: two or more claimants 
claimed to have a better right or status than the opponents 
or to be less obliged to perform some duty (e.g., a liturgy, 
or compulsory public service). Here the formal distinction 
between private and public vanished, although in sub-
stance the cases belonged to one category or the other. 
The origin or oldest conceivable shape of judiciallitiga-
ti on among the Greeks cannot be discussed here (see 
Ancient Greek Law, subentry on The Origins of Ancient 
Greek Law). To understand the character of procedure in 
classical Athens, the specific meaning of dike is important. 
Originally, in connection with litigation dike did not mean 
"justice" or "law," but rather "private seizure" of one's 
opponent in order to carry out lawful revenge. The Greek 
polis succeeded in legitimizing these acts of self-help by 
bringing them under the control of the law courts (Wolff 
1946, p. 45; 1966, p. 91). In classical Athens parts of this 
concept survived in private cases: only the plaintiff (diökön , 
the one pursuing) had the right to summon the defendant 
(pheugön, the one fleeing) privately, and after a conviction 
he had also to enforce the verdict by seizing the debtor's 
goods privately. In homicide cases, which always remained 
dikai, the state took over the execution of the death pen-
alty, but the private plaintiff had the primitive residual 
right to observe it (Demosthenes 23.69). 
No classical source names the inventor of the traditional 
concept of dike, at that time understood as private action. 
In contrast, Aristotle (Constitution of the Athenians 9.1) 
mentions public actions by a boulomenos as one of the 
most democratic innovations of Solon (archon [chief 
magistrate] 594/593 B.C.E.). It seems plausible to connect 
this with Solon's prohibition of enslavement for debt 
(Harrison, 1971, p. 77). In later times graphai could be 
brought for persons who could not protect themselves 
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because they were unable to file a dike, as for maltreated 
parents, orphans, and heiresses. Nevertheless an examina-
tion of this type of action in other poleis (Rubinstein, 
2004) shows a tendency to use the boulomenos to execute 
sanctions against persons excluded from the civic com-
munity by a curse. Diadikasiai trials seem to have origi-
na ted from the magistrates' executive functions; they 
generated no theoretical interest in contemporary 
Athenian literature. To sum up, through an adversarial 
legal procedure a private plaintiff, in his own name or that 
of the state, pursued a seizure of the defendant's property 
or person; the state was responsible only for capital 
executions. 
Recent scholarship has shown that many kinds of dikai 
were essentially private tort actions. With regard to 
contracts, for example, there were no special actions for 
performance, nor did a general action for enforcing com-
pliance with a contract exist. The general dike was the dike 
blabes or suit for damages (Wolff, 1943, pp. 323ff.; 1957; 
Thür, 2003, pp. 237ff.). There also was no general action 
based on ownership, but rather several dikai in the form 
of actions for delicts including theft (Thür, 1982 and 2002). 
For public procedures one must keep in mind that 
Athenian democracy had no overall systematic concept of 
punishing offenses against the state. Thus, it is necessary 
to look closely at every procedure classified as a public 
action through a boulomenos (see below). 
Two stages: dialectical and rhetorical. The most striking 
feature is that every lawsuit was conducted in two sepa-
rate stages, one before the magistrate responsible for the 
individual case and one before a law court (dikasterion) 
that varied in size according to the issue (see Courts, 
Ancient Greek, subentry on Courts and Magistrates in 
Ancient Athens; and Procedure, subentry on Trial 
Procedure in Ancient Athens). The two stages had com-
pletely different functions: the first was a preliminary 
hearing, the second the decisive session. In the first , the 
magistrate checked the procedural requirements, in par-
ticular whether the case belonged to his jurisdiction, and 
then conducted several preliminary hearings where the 
litigants met to discuss the whole issue. Presided over by 
a fellow citizen with public authority-the judicial magis-
trates were citizens chosen by lot for one-year terms-
these sessions may often have led to compromises. If not, 
litigants carefully prepared the matters at issue for 
addressing the court. It was required by law that the oppo-
nents answer each other's questions at these hearings 
(Demosthenes 46.10). These answers, given before wit~ 
nesses who always accompanied the litigants, could not 
be contes ted laterin court. 
There were three kinds of preliminary hearings. First, 
the anakrisis (examination) was conducted by the archons. 
Second, the diaita (arbitration) was held by a diaitetes, a 
public arbitrator chosen by lot. He had the same duties as 
an archon. Aristotle (Constitution of the Athenians 53.3) 
adds that, when the litigants came into court, they could as 
a matter of fairness use no documents (including the testi-
mo nies of witnesses) other than those presented to the 
opponent at the diaita. That is also true for anakrisis cases 
(Thür, 2007). Third, the preliminary hearings in homicide 
cases were called prodikasiai. In all three kinds of prelimi-
nary hearings litigants prepared their cases in the same 
way: they knew each other's witnesses and their deposi-
tions because every witness had to swear apretrial oath. 
Because these hearings all involved questions and answers, 
this stage can be called "dialectical" (Thür, 1977, p. 313). 
The next stage was the main hearing, or court trial. Here 
a panel of citizens (dikastai) always decided the issue in a 
session lasting no more than one day. Often a panel heard 
severallawsuits in one day. This required strict adherence 
to a schedule. The amount of time allowed for speeches 
was fixed by law (on the basis of the issue's importance) 
and measured out to the parties by a waterclock (klepsy-
dra). The dikastai voted immediately after the parties gave 
their speeches, rendering the first and final decision. 
Because speeches occupied most of this stage it may be 
labeled "rhetoricaI." 
Diamartyria and paragraphe. In inheritance cases the 
preliminary stage, before the archon, could become the 
definitive one if only one collateral relative claimed 
the estate. In that case, the archon did not render a verdict 
but issued a simple decree (epidikasia) approving the 
claim. When opposing claims were entered, preliminary 
hearings and a judicial decision through diadikasia were 
necessary. A legitimate male descendant of the deceased, 
however, was entitled to enter upon the property without 
legal formality by using self-help: he could protest against 
any epidikasia decree of the archon by a formal witness 
testimony (diamartyria) confirming the existence of a 
legitimate son. This testimony tied the archon's hands 
unless it was negated by a successful suit for false testi-
mony. Diamartyriai could be used before magistrates other 
than the archon by a defendant who protested that the 
suit against hirn was not maintainable, as when the mat-
ter had been settled by arbitration. The deposition barred 
the magistrate from referring the case to the dikasterion 
for trial until the witness was sentenced (Wallace, 2001). 
ln the fourth century another form of protest prevailed, 
that of entering aparagraphe (!it. writing beside). Instead of 
indirectly challenging a witness's testimony the defendant 
could force the magistrate to bring the preliminary ques-
tion, whether the case was to be referred to court or not, 
independently ·from the ~ain issue. A short note written on 
the statement of claim "beside" the plaintiffs petition was 
sufficient. By entering a paragraphe the defendant had the 
advantage of pleading first, because this remedy was con-
sidered to open an action against the lawsuit. The paragraphe 
was introduced in 403/402 B.C.E. to support the amnesty 
enacted at the restoration of democracy. Further provisions 
were added later, so that the paragraphe could be against a 
suit on matters already settled (by release and discharge, or 
by a previous dike), when the wrong legal process was cho-
sen, or because of limitation of time. Paragraphe cases were 
conducted with the utmost rhetorical shrewdness 
(Demosthenes 32-38; Wolff, 1966; Thür, 2002, pp. 60-77). 
Trial in court. Formally, the trial was a very simple thing: 
after the parties each gave their pleas for a measured 
length of time, the dikastai secretly cast their votes without 
deliberating or giving reasons. The pebbles were counted, 
and a herald announced the total. Much of the rationality 
in modem concepts of jurisdiction is obviously missing. 
Where did this simple pattern originate? The irrational 
concept of casting secret votes on a legal issue appears to 
be a primitive ordeal replacing another equally primitive 
procedure, a decisive oath swom by one of the Iitigants. 
This explanation is only a hypothesis based on the Archaic 
provisions of Draco's law and the litigants' oaths that still 
preceded a trial in classical times (see Courts, Ancient 
Greek, subentry on Courts and Magistrates in Ancient 
Athens). Whatever its origins, the lack of rationality is still 
a characteristic feature of Athenian trials at the large 
dikastena in the time of the orators. The magistrates pre-
siding over a court had no discretionary authority. Their 
only responsibility was to see that every participant-liti-
gants, supporters, witnesses, and laymen judges-applied 
and observed the formal rules. The magistrate never asked 
questions and did not even vote. The trial was so focused 
on the opposing speeches that the taking of evidence was 
almost completely disregarded. In the following only a few 
characteristic features will be emphasized. 
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Evidenee. Aristotle's famous account of the five means of 
prooE, "Iaws, witness, contracts, confessions under torture, 
oath" (Rhelorie 1375a24) has prevented scholars from 
gaining a clear insight into the Athenian law of evidence. 
In fact, the philosopher gives examples only of what he 
calls, in a rhetorical sense, "nonartistic proofs." When the 
clerk read aloud to the court a document prepared by a 
litigant, the waterclock stopped. These documents coming 
from outside the speech did not belong to the "art" of rhet-
oric and required a different mode of argumentation. 
The only relevant judicial proof to be found in court prac-
tice was witness testimony, and it was only moderately suc-
cessful (relative to modem law) in meeting the goal of 
determining the truth. Only free males were admitted as 
witnesses, and in court the witness could only confirm a 
deposition formulated by the litigant beforehand. In the 
fifth century he did this orally; in the fourth he simply 
affirmed a written text read aloud. No questioning or cross-
examination took place; if the witness was unwilling to 
confirm the deposition in court he could take an oath of 
disclaimer during the preparatory stage. At the trial the wit-
ness had to approach the speaker's platform to take legal 
responsibility for his testimony or moral responsibility for 
his oath ofdisclaimer (Thür, 2004b, p. 161). There were sev-
eral means of compulsion against a reluctant witness, but 
only a witness who had positively affirmed the deposition 
was liable to a suit for false testimony after the main trial. 
The role of the Athenian witness was rather different from 
that of a modem witness and conveys an idea of the social 
background of judiciallitigation in Athens (see below). 
Other means of proof were employed outside court. The 
dikastena, panels of hundreds of judges, were unable to 
Counting Votes. Possible scene of the counting of votes at an ostracism. A man (second from 
right) holding a stylus and writing tablet tallies the votes whiIe a boy (righl) approaches with 
a bowl containing another batch. A third figure (second from Zeft) holds more votes as another 
man takes down a writing case. Red-figure kyZix (drinking cup) attributed to the Pan Painter, 
c. 470 B.C.E. ASHMOLEAN MUSEUM, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD 
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examine the authenticity of a document, and there was in 
any case insufficient time to do so during a court session. 
Thus a litigant brought witnesses to confirm their'authen-
ticity or challenged his opponent be forehand to concede 
the issue. Likewise, achallenge (proklesis) , always issued 
before witnesses, was necessary to question slaves under 
torture. Slave testimony was not relevant unless given 
under torture; for practical reasons it was done out of 
court and with the opponent's agreement (see Torture, 
subentry on Ancient Athens). Also, oaths to be sworn out 
of court to affirm certain facts or to setde the whole case 
were only relevant after an agreement resulting from a 
challenge. Most challenges mentioned in court speeches 
were refused. Challenging one's opponent in order to ga in 
arguments from his refusing the challenge was a common 
forensic tactic. In sum, Athenian law courts seem on the 
one hand in many ways to have relied more on formal 
means of evidence-gathering than on determining sub-
stantive truth. On the other hand, because the sentence 
was nonappealable and the voting secret, neither the court 
panel nor an individual judge had to account for their 
assessment of the evidence. 
Verdict. Like other peculiar features of a trial before the 
large dikasteria, the verdict differed from what we expect 
today. The panel had no authority to formulate a sentence; 
far from deliberating, they simply voted under the formal 
direction of the presiding magistrate. Thus the law courfs 
only task was to vote "yes" or "no" (i.e., "guilty" or "not 
guilty") on the plaintiffs claim. Nobody pronounced a judg-
ment; the herald simply called out the result of the vote 
(Aristode, Constitution ofthe Athenians 69.1; Thür, 2004a, 
p. 43) . This rigid system could work satisfactorily only when 
the law mandated only one consequence (e.g., the death 
penalty for premeditated murder). The Athenians called 
these lawsuits atimetoi (without estimation [by the jury]). 
If the law provided a range of punishments (e.g., death, 
exile, and a fine), the court had to decide the penalty by a 
second vote, again without deliberating. Each litigant pro-
posed a penalty, and the panel then chose one of these by 
a simple "yes" or "no." Lawsuits of this sort were called 
timetoi (with estimation), and most private cases, espe-
cially cases of blabe (darnage), were of this sort. Involving 
the litigants in the estimation led to a great psychological 
challenge: if the victorious plaintiff proposed too high a 
penalty, he risked having the judges vote for the defen-
dant's estimation-and vice versa when the defendant 
proposed too low a penalty. Socrates, for example, was 
found guilty hy 281 of 501 votes, but he refused to counter 
the plaintiff's estimation with another reasonable penalty, 
proposing instead that the city grant hirn puhlic honors. 
Thus the court could only choose the death penalty, which 
had been proposed by the plaintiff (Plato, Apology 38b). 
Occasionally a third vote took place when the defendant 
had been convicted of theft and the penalty to be paid to 
the plaintiff had been fixed by tlmesls (estimation). 
Through an additional penalty estimation (prostimesis), 
probably moved by the victorious plaintiff, the court had 
to vote whether to confine the defendant in stocks in a 
public place for five days. This degrading punishment was 
the only penalty with any similarity to a prison sentence. 
Regular punishments were death, exile, confiscation of 
property, and financial penalties. When the verdict was 
assessed in private disputes, the penalty was normally a 
fine . Only a few texts of judgments are preserved from 
anywhere in Greece, mostly in inscriptions on stone; they 
fit the Athenian pattern. The documents contain just the 
charge and a note of condemnation or acquittal some-
times followed by the total votes (Thür, 1987). In both the 
preliminary stage and the trial proper, judgments by 
default were possible; two months were allowed for 
excuses for nonappearance (Pollux, Onomasticon 8.61). 
Dike pseudomartyriön, anadikia, execution. A verdict 
rendered by a dikasterion was final. Bringing the same 
case again was balTed by a kind of special plea, the 
paragraphe. The losing party could indirectly recover his 
financialloss by suing a witness by a dike pseudomartyriön 
(suit for false witness) . If convicted, the witness had to pay 
a fine in the amount of the damage (blabe) that resulted 
from the false testimony. But a party who had suffered no 
loss or had even won his suit could also file this action, 
probably for injured reputation, wh ich was always 
involved in cases of blabe. Because a witness who had 
been convicted three times lost his civil rights, it might 
have been enough for the prosecutor to bring the witness 
one step closer to this point. It is unclear if, and under 
what conditions, the trial could be reopened (in a process 
called anadikia) after the conviction of a witness . One can 
assurne that, as a rule, the conviction of the witness did 
not set aside the verdict of the main trial. When money 
was concemed, the victorious plaintiff carried out the exe-
cution of judgments in private suits. In Athens since 
Solon's time, self-help against the debtor's person was for-
bidden. The death penalty was executed by the state; for 
enforcing exile and handling confiscations, there were 
actions through a boulomenos. 
Court fees. Both parties had to pay a fee called the pry-
taneia in an amount depending on the value of the mat-
ter in dispute: under a hundred drachmas, there was no 
fee , between a hundred and a thousand, three drachmas, 
and above a thousand, thirty drachmas. All payments 
Went to the state for the courts' expenses, and the losing 
party had to reimhurse his opponent for his fee. Details 
are unclear. In public suits another kind of court fee, the 
parastasis , was paid by the plaintiff alone. In some pub-
Hc suits a deposit was required, sometimes one-fifth of 
the value of the claim, or under special circumstances in 
inheritance claims, one-tenth of the value of the estate 
(parakatabole) . 
Plaintiffs could be penalized for frivolous litigation. 
Volunteer prosecutors (boulomenoi) in most public suits 
who abandoned their suit or failed to secure one-fifth of 
the votes at the trial were fined one thousand drachmas 
and lost their right to proceed in public actions, probably 
until they had paid. In some private suits, as when enter-
ing a paragraphe, an unsuccessful defendant had to pay to 
the opponent one-sixth of the value of the claim at issue 
(epöbelia). Defendants condemned through dike exoules 
(for illegal self-help in a dispute about a piece of land), 
besides forfeiting their tide, had to pay to both the plain-
tiff and the state the value of the property. 
Summary of Actions. All dikai belong to one basic type 
of action, while public lawsuits, wh ich have in common 
the fact that they were initiated by a volunteer (boulome-
nos), can be further classified on the basis of their pro ce-
dural aspects. 
Dikai. Todd (1993, pp. 101-105) lists alphabetically all 
twenty-eight names of private actions attested in the 
sources; some are known from court speeches as actual 
cases, so me are known only by name. One must be cau-
tious with these names, which derived from substantive 
aspects of the cases and often reflect only one remarkable 
external fact. Though variously named, many dikai were 
based on the principle of damage (blabe), and the action 
labeled dike blabes, in substance, represented different 
claims. It is only the occasional qualifying term that 
informs us about special rules of procedure. A dike called 
emporike, for instance, belonged to the class of private 
cases involving maritime traders. Foreigners could, under 
exceptional circumstances, enter these lawsuits, even 
against Athenian citizens. These cases had a special sched-
ule: they were probably conducted only during winter 
when traders were ashore. They are among the group of 
dikai emmenoi (Ht. in-a-month actions), wh ich may mean 
that the magistrate had to setde the case within one month 
or, according to another interpretation, that they could be 
initiated only on a certain day of each month (Todd, 1993, 
pp. 334-336). The filing of inheritance cases was not per-
mitted in the last month of the archon's year in office 
(Demosthenes 46.22), and the basileus (one ofthe archons) 
did not accept suits for homicide in the last three months 
of his year (Antiphon 6.42). Other characteristics of single 
dikai have been given in the general overview. 
Public actions. In the time of the orators several other 
suits, in addition to the main type, the graphe, could be 
initiated by a volunteer plaintiff (the boulomenos). Some 
of these did not differ from each other in substantive 
requirements but only in procedure. 
Graphai. The n;:tain features of "written actions" are 
mentioned above under the general characteristics of 
Athenian procedure. In the fifth and fourth centuries, the 
fact that graphai were filed in writing had no special sig-
nificance, because every claim had to be filed as a written 
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document. Therefore a traditional dike was also some-
times referred to as a graphe, and the defendant's plea as 
an antigraphe. Public actions generally pursued offenses 
against public interests. Graphai were brought, for exam-
pIe, for proposing an illegal decree (paranomön) (see 
Graphe Paranornon), for impiety (graphe asebeias), for 
abusing one's right to initiate public actions (graphe syko-
phantias), for pretending to be an Athenian citizen (graphe 
xenias), or for wrongful, insulting, insolent, or excessive 
behavior (graphe hybreös, Cohen, 1995, p. 144). The latter 
may be classified also with graphai that protect private 
persons unable to prosecute in their own name, such as 
maltreated elderly parents, orphans, heiresses (graphe 
kaköseös, for ill-treatment), or a man seized privately 
under false accusation for adultery. A distinguishing fea-
ture of graphai, in contrast to all private dikai and so me 
other public actions, was the fine of one thousand drach-
mas levied against the prosecutor when he abandoned the 
case or failed to obtain one-fifth of the votes at the trial. 
This provision was intended to prevent bribery and syko-
phantia (maHcious prosecution). It was a common tactic 
to pursue a citizen active in politics with frivolous claims, 
blackmailing hirn to withdraw the action. The bribing of a 
sincere prosecutor to withdraw was a danger inherent in a 
system based on volunteer prosecution of public offenses. 
On the other hand, the great financial risk agraphe involved 
could deter citizens from using that procedure even when 
it was justified. This was true also in the private sphere, as 
with the maltreatment of orphans. As will be shown below, 
innovations attempted to solve these problems. 
Todd (1993, pp. 105-109) lists twenty-five attested 
names of graphai, and Harrison (1971, p. 82) lists graphai 
with fixed penalties (atimetoi) and those whose penalties 
were assessed in court (timetoi). 
Eisangeliai. The eisangelia (public announcement), a 
procedure open to a volunteer (boulomenos) by denuncia-
tion, became the most important batdefield for political 
struggles in fourth-century Athenian democracy. It was 
used mainly against treason, political corruption, and 
attempts to overthrow the constitution; it was initiated in 
the Assembly (ekklesia) and decided by the dikasterion (see 
Courts, Ancient Greek, subentry on Courts and Magistrates 
in Ancient Athens). The denouncer was authorized by the 
ekklesia to act as prosecutor without paying a court fee but 
was subject to a fine of a thousand drachmas if he aban-
doned the case. He was originally not required to obtain 
more than one-fifth of the votes, but widespread abuse of 
the procedure made it necessary to drop the last privilege. 
Exceptionally in Athenian procedure, the accused could 
be held under custodial arrest between denunciation and 
trial. The name eisangelia was also applied to a variety of 
other procedures, such as those for maladministration by 
magistrates decided by the Council (Hansen, 1991, p. 213), 
or for maltreatment of orphans (Harrison, 1968, p.118). 
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Phasis. Other actions for punishing public wrongs, espe-
cially in financial matters, were included in the category 
of phasis (Wallace, 2003). Like eisangelia, phasis (lit. mak-
ing visible) was a kind of denunciation and was as a rule 
aimed at the offender's property. The offenses were spe-
cialized and distributed over various fields: oversea grain-
trade, mining, digging up olive trees, mismanagement of 
an orphan's estate. The boulomenos was to bring his pha-
sis to any magistrate who had authority in that area. 
Common characteristics see m to have been a fine of a 
thousand drachmas for abandoning the case or for failing 
to secure one-fifth of the votes, and a premium for the suc-
cessful plaintiff in the amount of half of the sum adjudi-
cated by the court after estimation, timesis (Todd, 1993, p. 
119). Actions with a similar premium are known all over 
the Greek world under different names. In Greek society, 
personal profit, as well as personal animosity, kept many 
public actions going. 
Execution of sentences: apagöge and apographe (diadika-
siai). Volunteers were used not only to prosecute public 
offenses but also to execute sentences. While the death 
penalty was carried out by state officials-normally the 
condemned committed suicide in prison-exile was sanc-
tioned by the provision that any citizen was allowed to use 
apagöge to seize an exiled person who had returned unlaw-
fully to Attica and bring hirn before the thesmothetai (the 
six junior archons). This step was a private act of self-help 
on behalf of the state. The thesmothetai then had to refer 
the case to a dikasterion for trial, with death as the penalty. 
Self-help through apagöge was also allowed to any citizen 
against common criminals (kakourgoi). The defendants 
were brought be fore the Eleven, citizens responsible for 
guarding prisoners and supervising executions, who could 
summarily render death sentences. 
Volunteers also enforced monetary sentences, such as 
confiscation and debts to the state. In either case the volun-
teer drafted a list (apographe) denouncing respectively all 
the condemned's confiscated property or part of the debt-
or's goods up to the value of the amount owed to the state. 
The term apographe was used also for this form of prosecu-
tion and any trial to which it gave rise. Two sorts of trials 
could follow. When the apographe was aimed at a person 
accused of having diverted goods from another person who 
had been sentenced earlier (Lysias 19 and 29), the person 
whose property had been listed might contest the validity 
of the denunciation, and a court would decide the issue. A 
person whose sentence was confiscation, however, never 
used this plea hirnself. The other kind of trial started with a 
protest (enepiskemma) by one or more parties who claimed 
to have ownership of or mortgage on some of the goods 
listed in the apographe. In this case the court heard all the 
claims in diadikasiai conducted between the volunteer 
denouncer and each of the claimants, generally mortgage-
holders as documented in a surviving judgment (Langdon, 
1991, P3, pp. 76ff.). The denouncer risked being fined a 
thousand drachmas for not obtaining one-fifth of the votes, 
but if he won the case he was rewarded with (probably) 
one-third of the sum raised by selling the property at auc-
tion (Todd, 1993, p. 118). The objector who claimed prop-
erty or a mortgage had to deposit one-fifth of the value of 
his claim, which was forfeit to the state if he lost. 
Other kinds of diadikasiai did not involve a volunteer 
enforcing the payment of debts to the state. If an Athenian 
citizen, because of his personal wealth, was assigned a 
compulsory public service (liturgy), he had two ways to 
protest and bring the case to court. By skepsis (excuse) he 
could plead for an exemption for statutorily fixed personal 
reasons. (A trierarch who could not properly hand over 
his ship at the end of his term might claim also by skepsis 
that the loss was caused by a storm.) A court then decided 
through diadikasia on the merits of the excuse. The sec-
ond way to avoid a liturgy was to designate another citi-
zen, claim he was wealthier, and challenge hirn either to 
take over the duty or to exchange properties (antidosis). If 
he refused to do either, the issue was referred to a court, 
which decided in a diadikasia which party should be 
assigned the service. As in the apographe procedure, the 
term diadikasia in liturgy cases was used for trials that 
aimed neither at public punishment nor at private 
demands to seize the defendant's property. Diadikasia was 
always a purely declaratory action, which was in public 
life generally conducted between two riyal claimants. 
Dokimasia and euthynai . A great number of public 
actions rose from the many scrutiny procedures (doki-
masiai) that Athenian democracy required every year. 
Dokimasia itself was not a trial, but rather a test of a per-
son's qualification. Four main types of dokimasia existed: 
that of incoming magistrates, that of "orators" (citizens 
who addressed the Assembly), that of epheboi (ephebi, 
young men to be enrolled on the citizen list), and that of 
new citizens (after a decree granting citizenship). The rou-
tine checks were conducted before the Council or a 
dikasterion panel. Witnesses testified that the legal require-
ments had been met. If anyone challenged the candidate, 
different types of trials followed in the various cases, and 
the sanctions also differed: the candidate elected or cho-
sen by lot was not allowed to take up the office; an unqual-
ified politician who had addressed the ekklesia became 
disfranchised; and condemnations in matters of citizen-
ship could result in the candidate's being sold into slavery. 
. In the same way, the financial accounts of each magis-
trate-if he had public money in his hands-were audited 
through euthynai (public examinations) monthly during 
his term and after his term had ended. Special officers 
(logistai) and any private citizen were allowed to prosecute 
the magistrate for mismanagement or embezzlement. 
Nonfinancial euthynai were conducted by other officers 
(euthynoi) temporarily appointed for that job. 
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Legal procedure in Athenian life. Finally, one may 
ask how the Athenians themselves dealt with the pleth-
ora of legal procedures in their private and pubJic Jives. 
As the court speeches show, they did so masterfully. Out 
of the arsenal of available procedures, each plaintiff 
chose the weapons that best fit his needs. Since many 
procedures overlapped substantively it was hard to cal-
culate what reasons a dikasterion would accept as ade-
quate, for instance, in prosecuting for assault. Options 
ranged from a private dike aikias before 201 judges to a 
dike for "wo unding with intent to kill" before the 
Areopagos , or a graphe hybreös (for a dishonoring assault) 
heard by 501 judges; each procedure carried a different 
penalty. For theft and maltreatment of orphans, dikai 
and graphai coexisted, and in the latter case an eisangelia 
was also an option. Homicide actions and apagöge also 
overlapped. 
Today it seems nearly impossible to organize the many 
Athenian private and pubJic procedures into a coherent 
system. Most modem authors, following the ancient 
sources, do not separate the law of procedure from sub-
stantive law or enforcement measures from judicial deci-
sions. This overview concentrates on the latter. Other ways 
of arranging alI this material, together with some terms 
not included here or not at their usual place, will be found 
in other articles (see Courts, Ancient Greek, subentry on 
Courts and Magistrates in Ancient Athens; and Procedure, 
subentry on Trial Procedure in Ancient Athens) . 
Litigation in Athens. Before discussing the social 
background of the Athenian law of procedure, it has been 
necessary to explain the legal framework from an inteDlal 
perspective. Through its strictly democratic character the 
Athenian legal process differed from all other types his-
torically known. Democracy meant formal equality and 
equal opportunity (within the privileged dass of male citi-
zens). A trial was a match fought with exactly timed 
speeches and decided by the "ordeal" of an anonymously 
voting mass of citizens. In the preceding sections, some 
pecuJiar legal features have been explained in this con-
text. Athenian court speeches, however, give a deeper 
insight into social and mental reaJities. To conclude, two 
different sociological approaches may be mentioned. The 
first uses comparative anthropology and emphasizes the 
competitive, feuding character of Athenian society; law 
courts were the "arena" for litigation as a central feature 
of sociallife. The other approach has arisen out of a new 
interest in oratory as performance and in the interdepen-
dency between actor and audience. As in dramatic perfor-
. mances, litigation created civic identity on both sides of 
the "stage." 
The main representative of the first approach is David 
Cohen (1995, pp. 181-211). Because Athens in the time of 
the orators was an agonistic society, conflict was in Cohen's 
view not a "pathological dysfunction" that procedural insti-
tutions could or should expunge, and the legal process did 
not setde litigation but perpetuated it . At the t:ore of any 
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Athenian judicial agön (trial) was the comparative assess-
ment of the parties as citizens, judged not according to the 
statutory nonns to be applied in the specific case, but 
according to the normative expectations of the commu-
nity, considering the parties' honor and entire civic life. 
Consequently, witnesses in a trial were not a means of 
determining the truth; rather they were expected to lie in 
support of their party. In a continuous competition for 
wealth, powel~ and influence, Athenian elites submitted to 
the judgment of panels of fellow citizens with far lesser 
claims. Litigants often used the courts to pursue conflict, 
not to terminate it, and litigation provided an arena for the 
expression, exacerbation, and perpetuation of conflict (for 
new aspects of this discretionary system of justice, see 
Lanni, 2006). This view is not as revolutionary as it seems. 
In every legal system, there is to some degree a similar 
background to judicial litigation. Athens may have been 
peculiar in the profusion of political trials conducted 
between personal rivals. Cohen attempts to explain why, 
but not how, trials were conducted in Athens. It is unsatis-
fying to maintain that witnesses were lying (Cohen 1995, 
pp. 108, 186) without asking further what witness deposi-
tions looked like and how litigants handled them in prac-
tice (Thür, 2004b). 
Partly in conflict with this view of feud in the "arena" 
is the theory of communication from the "stage" 
(Scafuro, 1997; Johnston, 1999). While Cohen denies 
the autonomy of law and the courts, Johnston (1999, pp. 
126-130) concedes a semiautonomy; litigation for hirn 
is more than' an extension of a social contest for honor. 
These more recent authors concentrate not on lifelong 
litigation, but rather on the methods by which litigants 
settled one specific issue, wh ich nevertheless could take 
a considerable amount of time. Although from a legal 
aspect it is only transactions between the litigants that 
are of interest, social history envisages the dispute 
between thern in relation to an audience. Here the two 
(or three) steps of every lawsuit become important. The 
audience of the first informal private meetings were 
friends and neighbors. Each litigant tried to win their 
backing by showing his willingness to offer extrajudicial 
composition. Compromise rather than litigation was of 
the highest social value (Scafuro, 1997, p. 141). These 
meetings continued during the preparatory dialectical 
phase of the judicial process (see above). The trial in 
court was completely different, a real performance on 
stage. In ~his last, "rhetorical" phase, the parties com-
municated with the audience on the general values of 
Athenian dernocracy, including the desirability of peace-
ful solutions. Both views-of litigation in the arena and 
of litigation as performance-are valid as far as proce-
dure is concerned. The important distinction is that 
Athenian courts settled legal cases, not disputes in gen-
eral. One can assume, against Cohen, that disputes were 
ended, not by court decisions (so Johnston, 1999, p. 140, 
n. 31), but by changes in social relations. 
[See also Athens; Graphe Paranornon; and Homicide, 
subentry on Ancient Greek Law.) 
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GERHARD THÜR 
Trial Procedure in Ancient Athens 
Considering the plethora of judicial magistrates and of 
actions to be filed with them, Athenian procedural law 
seems to have been extremely complicated. However, 
Athenians knew only one pattern of trial procedure, and 
both private and public actions were conducted in almost 
the same way. This article describes a typicallawsuit from 
the summons to the verdict. Because every lawsuit had 
to pass through two stages, the first two sections will 
describe the preparatory stage and court day. In an ap-
pendix on the audience and freedom of speech, some 
observations will be made on judges and the public as 
audience. 
Preparatory Stage. When private discussions before 
friends and neighbors could not settle the case, a plaintiff 
took the first step toward trial. He made sure of a date 
when the magistrate responsible for the case was officiat-
ing. At least four days earlier than this, he took two wit-
nesses with hirn and privately summoned the defendant 
to appear before the magistrate. The summons had to 
state the plaintiffs claim. A volunteer prosecutor in a pub-
Hc action followed the same procedure, although probably 
without any previous private meetings. Trials that fol-
lowed summary measures by magistrates started without 
summons. These included punishment for someone 
brought by apagöge to the Eleven, the denunciation of 
confiscated property (apographe) to the Eleven, and the 
allotment (epidikasia) of an inheritance or an heiress by 
the archon. Confiscation and inheritance cases were 
announced pubHcly in the People's Assembly. 
After a summons, the plaintiff or prosecutor stated his 
claim or accusation to the magistrate and the defendant 
then gave his response. Alternatively, the defendant could 
instead fi)e a special plea (paragraphe) that the case was 
not actionable. At least from the beginning of the fourth 
century B.C.E., all of these statements had to be in "vriting. 
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These documents were extremely important: by voting 
"guilty" or "not guilty," the judges convicted or acquitted 
the defendant simply by endorsing one of the two state-
ments (see below). After the magistrate had accepted the 
pleas, the litigants had to pay the court fees. Then the 
magistrate fixed a date when he would hold pretrial ses-
sions. If several actions were brought to hirn on the same 
day, he drew lots to determine in what order the sessions 
would take place. If the defendant, although properly 
summoned, did not appear, the magistrate could refer the 
case directly to the dikasterion (people's court) for trial. 
Finally, the plaintiffs' pleas were written on whitened 
tablets and posted in the agora. 
There were three kinds of pretrial sessions: prodikasiai, 
anakrisis, and diaita, the last handled by an arbitrator 
chosen by lot. In private cases, all three types helped to 
avoid trial by promoting compromise. In public lawsuits, 
however, the prosecutor was not allowed to abandon the 
case and was fined 1,000 drachmas to prevent sykophantia 
(malicious prosecution). The preliminary sessions before 
the magistrate and the diaitetes (arbitrator) gave litigants 
the opportunity to prepare for the trial. This preparation 
consisted of questioning each other and, as a matter of 
fairness, disclosing all their documentary evidence to be 
used before the court. We have direct evidence for the lat-
ter provision only in the case of diaita (Ath. Pol. 53 .3), but 
it is generally thought that in all kinds of preparatory ses-
sions, sealed ceramic pots (echinoi) were used to keep the 
documents safe for the hearing (Thür, 2007). The diaitetes 
chosen by lot had no authority to give an award. Only 
when both litigants agreed with his opinion was the case 
settled. If they did not, then the case would continue 
directly to trial. Because the diaitetes did not render a ver-
dict, technically there was no "appeal." Like the magis-
trates, the diaitetes conducted preparatory sessions, in 
which the litigants used the techniques of "dialectic," 
question and answer. If these sessions did not result in a 
peaceful settlement, the magistrates in charge turned to 
the thesmothetai. These magistrates scheduled the ses-
sions of the dikasteria and assigned their dates by lot (Ath. 
Pol. 59.1). 
Court Day. What happened at the preliminary stage 
before the case was brought to the magistrates is, to a 
large extent, based on conjecture. Only by chance do the 
sources reveal some details. We know much more, how-
ever, about the trial before the dikasteria. A dikasterion had 
to render judgment in a session lasting one day at most. 
On the basis of a Hterary source, the Aristotelian 
Constitution 'of Athens (Ath. Pol.), chapters 63-69, and 
archeological discoveries in the agora (summarized by 
Boegehold, 1995), a "court day" can be reconstructed in 
full detail. These excavations have revealed the sites, build-
ings, and equipment of the law courts, which makes it 
easier to understand the contemporary account in Ath. 
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state the plaintiff's claim. A volunteer prosecutor in a pub-
lic action followed the same procedure, although probably 
without any previous private meetings. Trials that fol-
lowed summary measures by magistrates started without 
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not actionable. At least from the beginning of the fourth 
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These documents were extremely important: by voting 
"guilty" or "not guilty," the judges convicted or acquitted 
the defendant simply by endorsing one of the two state-
ments (see below). After the magistrate had accepted the 
pleas, the Iitigants had to pay the court fees. Then the 
magistrate fixed a date when he would hold pretrial ses-
sions. If several actions were brought to hirn on the same 
day, he drew lots to determine in what order the sessions 
would take place. If the defendant, although properly 
summoned, did not appear, the magistrate could refer the 
case directly to the dikasterion (people's court) for trial. 
Finally, the plaintiffs' pleas were written on whitened 
tablets and posted in the agora. 
There were three kinds of pretrial sessions: prodikasiai, 
anakrisis, and diaita, the last handled by an arbitrator 
chosen by lot. In private cases, all three types helped to 
avoid trial by promoting compromise. In public lawsuits , 
however, the prosecutor was not allowed to abandon the 
case and was fined 1,000 drachmas to preventsykophantia 
(malicious prosecution). The preliminary sessions before 
the magistrate and the diaitetes (arbitrator) gave litigants 
the opportunity to prepare for the trial. This preparation 
consisted of questioning each other and, as a matter of 
fairness, disclosing all their documentary evidence to be 
used before the court. We have direct evidence for the lat-
ter provision only in the case of diaita (Ath. Pol. 53.3), but 
it is generally thought that in all kinds of preparatory ses-
sions, sealed ceramic pots (echinoi) were used to keep the 
documents safe for the hearing (Thür, 2007). The diaitetes 
chosen by lot had no authority to give an award. Qnly 
when both litigants agreed with his opinion was the case 
settled. If they did not, then the case would continue 
directly to trial. Because the diaitetes did not render a ver-
dict, technically there was no "appeal." Like the magis-
trates, the diaitetes conducted preparatory sessions, in 
which the litigants used the techniques of "dialectic," 
question and answer. If these sessions did not result in a 
peaceful settlement, the magistrates in charge turned to 
the thesmothetai. These magistrates scheduled the ses-
sions of the dikasteria and assigned their dates by lot (Ath. 
Pol. 59.1) . 
Court Day. What happened at the preliminary stage 
before the case was brought to the magistrates is, to a 
large extent, based on conjecture. Only by chance do the 
sources reveal some details. We know much more, how-
ever, about the trial before the dikasteria. A dikasterion had 
to render judgment in a session lasting one day at most. 
On the basis of a literary source, the Aristotelian 
Constitution of Athens (Ath. Pol.), chapters 63-69, and 
archeological discoveries in the agora (summarized by 
Boegehold, 1995), a "court day" can be reconstructed in 
full detail. These excavations have revealed the sites, build-
ings, and equipment of the law courts, which makes it 
easier to understand the contemporary account in Ath. 
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Pol. The kleröterion (Ath. Pol. 63.2), for instance, was once 
thought to be a room for drawing lots until it was identi-
fied (Dow, 1939) as an instrument for choosing jurors by 
lot for a court day. As documented by the Ath. Pol., 
Athenian democratic administration of justice reached its 
peak in the last third of fourth century B.C.E. Strict equal-
ity of the parties and equal opportunity were the leading 
principles, and in order to prevent the bribing of judges 
and presiding magistrates, and the formation of groups of 
supporters sitting together, the jurors were only allotted to 
courts on the day of the trial. They were chosen from all 
ten divisions (phylai, tribes) of citizens and allotted to 
courts equitably. In addition, jurors were allotted specific 
seats on the benches, and the courts were allotted at the 
same time to the magistrates who would preside that day. 
All this was done by drawing lots. For more detail, and for 
changes over time, see Boegehold, 1995, pp. 21--42. 
Manning the courts. Activities started early in the 
morning. Because citizens serving as judges (dikastai) 
were paid three obols for a court day, manning the courts 
was done quickly to save time for the hearings. Boegehold 
(1995, p. 36, note 51, see also p. 109, note 17) locates the 
scene at a complex of three buildings northeast of the 
agora that was easily enclosed by a fence . Ten entrances 
led to the restricted area, one for the dikastai of each phyle 
(tribe). The candidates approached with their bronze 
tokens (pinakion) in hand to identify themselves as eligi-
ble judges. In addition to giving the candidate's name and 
deme name, each token was marked with one of the first 
ten letters of the alphabet (alpha to kappa) because each 
phyle was subdivided into ten sections. Outside each of the 
ten gates were two allotment machines (kleroteria) and ten 
boxes. In addition, each phyle needed one to four addi-
tional boxes (to match the number of dikasteria to be 
manned that day), two jugs with acorns marked with one 
further letter (lamda, mu, nu, or xi), and a certain number 
of wooden staffs of up to four different colors. The total 
number of acorns and, correspondingly, staffs was exactly 
equal to the total number of judges needed that day; the 
letters on the acorns, corresponding to the colors of the 
staffs, each designated a single dikasterion sitting that day, 
fourpanels at most (Ath. Pol. 67.1; Thür, 2000, p. 45). Four 
small panels, for instance, operating at the same time in 
private cases needed 804 dikastai; two small public trials 
needed 1,002. Before the allotment of the dikastai could 
start, the letters on the acorns were assigned by lot to the 
equal numbers of colors. The colors marked the entrances 
to the courtrooms. After drawing lots, the corresponding 
letters were fixed at the entrances of the courtrooms and 
communicated to the ten magistrates at the entrances. 
Thus, each dikastes selected would be directed (by lot) to 
the entrance of a specific court. 
On a court day, all nine archons were in office, and each 
of them had to control the allotment procedure in one 
phyle, the tenth controlled by the secretary of the thes-
mothetai. In front of the gate of his phyle a prospective 
dikastes, threw his token into one of the ten boxes that was 
labeled with his section letter (alpha to kappa) . The boxes 
were shaken and the magistrate picked up a single token 
at random out of each box. Those ten citizens of each 
phyle (calIed empektai), in addition to being selected as 
judges, had to insert all tokens [rom their boxes into slots 
in the kleröterion. This was, as archeology has shown, a 
stele of marble with five columns of slots and a tube affixed 
vertically at one side to insert dice. Using two machines in 
each phyle, one for the columns with the letters alpha to 
epsilon, the other for those with eta to kappa, the ten 
empektai could insert the tokens very quiCkly. Then the 
magistrate shook up a cup of black and white dice and 
poured them into the tube. When he released them one by 
one, a white die meant that the candidates whose tokens 
were in that horizontal row of five tokens were on duty 
that day. Tokens in a row with a black die were not selected 
but were left in their slots until the whole allotment was 
over. A herald took the validated tokens , summoned the 
judges for the next allotment, and passed the tokens one 
after the other to the magistrate. Approaching the magis-
trate, each judge reached into a jug and withdrew an 
acorn. He showed the letter of his acorn to the magistrate 
who threw the token into one of the boxes corresponding 
to the letter on the acorn (when four panels were manned, 
the letters lamda, mu, nu, or xi). Thus, the dikastes was 
appointed to one of the panels sitting that day. To make 
sure that the judge indeed would approach the courtroom 
for which he was chosen, when he was leaving, he showed 
his acorn to a clerk and was given a staff whose color was 
matching the letter on the acorn (corresponding to the 
color of the courtroom entrance). Arriving there, he gave 
up his acorn and staff, receiving in turn a bronze token 
marked with one of twenty-five letters, the whole Greek 
alphabet plus the unusual sampi. He was placed accord-
ingly at one of the twenty-five benches, each for twenty 
dikastai, when dikasteria of 501 judges were sitting. Private 
cases needed only 201 or 401 dikastai, and tokens were 
given for ten or twenty benches, respectively. In this way, 
courts were manned equally from all phylai, judges prop-
erly seated, and cliques prevented. But before trials could 
start, further steps were necessary, by drawing lots again. 
While the panels were being set up, in the first court 
(the lamda court), an allotment of courts to magistrates 
was performed by means of two kleroteria. Only at 
that moment did it become clear which panel had to hear 
wh ich case. Thus, neither litigants nor magistrates 
could influence which court they were assigned to. When 
a magistrate arrived in his courtroom, the fence surround-
ing the complex was probably disassembled and litigants, 
supporters, witnesses, and audience could approach the 
courts. Before opening the sessions each magistrate had 
to appoint ten dikastai for executive functions. For this, 
the boxes with the tokens of each phyle were brought to 
the magistrate from each of the ten entrances. Thus, the 
tokens of the ten phylai were always separated. In each 
courtroom, for the last drawing of lots the presiding mag-
istrate shook each of the ten boxes and then took one 
token out of the box of each phyle at random. He dropped 
these ten tokens into one last empty box and, after shak-
ing the box drew one token. Its owner would tend the 
waterclock (klepsydra) . He then drew four more tokens to 
select the dikastai who would observe the voting ballots. 
The five remaining tokens designated those who would 
supervise the payment of the judges and the return of their 
tokens to them. Each of these five was responsible for two 
phylai. After the first allotment through the kleroteria, it 
made good sense to keep the tokens of each phyle in 
separate boxes from the beginning to the end of the 
court day. 
Trial. After extensive preparation, the trial was con-
ducted in a relatively simple way. The presiding magis-
trate had the secretary call the first case (if the panel was 
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to hear several that day). When a litigant did not appear, 
unless he had sworn an oath of excuse, the magistrate put 
the case to vote and the dikasterion rendered a judgment 
by default. When both litigants appeared, the charge and 
denial were read out, the parties swore to direct their 
speech to the actual issue, and the plaintiff or prosecutor 
then began the pleadings. The klepsydra had been filled 
for the plaintiff with the amount of water according to the 
matter in issue. In private cases of up to 1,000 drachmas, 
five choes of water were allocated (each chous provided 
about three minutes of speaking time), up to 5,000 drach-
mas seven choes, and beyond that ten. The same amount 
of time was allowed to the defendant. Each litigant had a 
second speech of two to three choes . In important public 
cases, the whole day was divided into one part for the 
prosecutor, one for the defendant, and a third for the 
assessment of the penalty. The day was calculated accord-
ing to the daylight of the shortest day in the month 
Poseideon (December). The litigants had to plead in per-
son. Unpaid supporters were allowed to speak, but their 
time counted against the time of their parties. Only when 
Athenian Trial Procedure. Klepsydra (water dock), fifth century B.C.E. The top vessel is a 
pIaster model. ATHENIAN AGORA EXCAVATIONS 
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a speaker had the secretary read aloud a document (filed 
in his echinos-jug at the preliminary stage), did the judge 
in charge stop the flow of the water; however, if the pleas 
were measured according to the daylight, the water dock 
did not stop, since the day could not be lengthened. 
Stealing time for one's case by having a lot of documents 
read aloud, theoretically, could upset the time schedule 
when several trials were heard on one day, but too many 
documents would probably have diminished the effective-
ness of a speech, and in practice, most speakers main-
tained a balance between speeches and documents read 
aloud outside of the time of speaking. Continuous speech 
(logos) rather than documents was thebest means to con-
vince the audience. Thus, the trial may be called the rhe-
torical stage of the case, different from the dialectical, 
preparatory stage before the magistrate. Because parties 
basically had to plead their cases in person, there were no 
professional attorneys or advocates. Professional help 
opera ted in the background, however, since logographoi 
(speechwriters) could prepare a court speech appropriate 
for the case and the speaker. Logographoi probably began 
advising their dients from the preparatory stages of the 
trial on. 
Simply having documents read aloud was not a means 
of proof in a legal sense. The only enforceable means 
of determining truth was witness testimony, and only 
free adult males had the capacity to give testimony at 
court. No private document had any value unless it was 
confirmed by witnesses, and events outside court (in-
duding the opponent's responses during the preparatory 
stage) could only be submitted as evidence by means of 
witness testimony. Such testimony had value because the 
witness exposed himself to a suit for false testimony (dike 
pseudomartyriön) and could be fined double the amoimt 
of damage his deposition caused. He also risked losing his 
civic rights (atimia) after a third conviction. For lack of 
time, witness testimony consisted purely of a confirma-
ti on to a statement formulated by the litigant himself. 
The witness had to be present, but he never recounted the 
events in his own words, nor was he subject to question-
ing or cross-examination in court. This primitive handling 
of evidence underlines the fact that an Athenian trial 
was a contest of speeches, in which the strict time limits 
provided equal opportunity to both sides. 
When the litigants had finished speaking, the judges 
voted immediately, without any summation by the pre-
siding magistrate (who was simply a layman chosen by 
lot) or any time for formal deliberation, although the 
hundreds of judges may have talked informally as they 
waited to vote. But, first, the herald made two announce-
ments: before the voting began, a litigant ' could chal-
lenge the testimony of any of his opponent's witnesses. If 
no challenge was issued at that time, a suit for false tes-
timony would not be allowed later. This provision, 
together with their knowledge of the witnesses' iden ti-
ties, enabled the judges to evaluate the depositions. The 
herald also announced which ballot counted for each 
speaker. 
The Athenians gave much thought to the voting proce-
dure. The ballots were a pair of bronze discs each with an 
axle in the middle, one axle pierced (for the first speaker, 
normally the plaintiff), the other full (for the second, the 
defendant) . Holding one in each hand between thumb and 
index finger 110 person except the judge himself could 
know his vote. Thus, a secret vote was guaranteed. ather 
mechanisms guaranteed fair voting procedure. The court 
used two ums: one of bronze and one of wood. The former 
held the valid ballots. lt could be disassembled to make 
sure that it was empty at the beginning, and had a fitting 
at the top that allowed only one ballot to go through at a 
time. The falling ballot gave a dear metallic sound. The 
wooden um was for discards and gave dull sound. After 
the herald's call, the judges gave up the token that desig-
nated their seats and received in turn a pair of ballots. 
Then, after casting their votes, each judge received one 
final bronze token marked with the letter gamma, mean-
ing "three ." It represented the three obols he was due for 
his day's service. 
But the day was not yet at an end. When all the judges 
had voted , the bronze um was emptied and the ballots 
were placed into the holes of a counting board, the full 
and the pierced ballots, separately. The herald then 
announced the total. A simple majority determined the 
outcome; a tie-which theoretically could not happen-
favored the defendant. No verdict or sentence was formu-
lated or announced, but the vote automatically validated 
either the plaintiff's or the defendant's initial statement 
(Thür, 2004, p. 43). 
In many cases, after a verdict of guilty, a second vote 
was necessary to fix ("estimate") the fine or penalty. 
In these cases, after the first vote each judge left the court-
room, received a colored staff, and then reentered and was 
seated according to his bench token. Each litigant then 
gave a very short speech justifying his estimate, and the 
judges then voted again, choosing between the plaintiff's 
and the defendant's estimations. The colored staffs were 
used again in the same way, when one or more court ses-
sions followed on that day. Distribution of the pay tokens 
was always the final act of the court day. The written state-
ments of each side, together with the count of the votes 
. and a notice of the estimate (if any) were publidy archived. 
No other record was kept. Execution of the verdict was 
a private matter; in public cases execution could lead to 
further trials at court. 
Audience and Freedom of Speech (Appendix). 
Modern readers can co me away with very different impres-
sions of an Athenian court day. Looking only at the rhe-
torical stage, it is easy to think that there was no contral 
on the pleadings, and that the litigants had complete free-
dom to speak about any subject they wished. By contrast, 
there were strict regulations, for instance, on the time 
limit for speaking, the reading-out of documents, and the 
conduct of the mass of citizens sitting as judges. In fact, in 
many preserved court speeches, we find passages with 
digressions and invectives. Some modern scholars explain 
these passages that for us seems to be "Irrelevant to the 
legal issue" as relevant for the Athenians (Cohen, 1995, 
pp. 92f.; Lanni, 2006); others argue irrelevancy nearly 
away (Rhodes, 2004). Athenians undoubtedly were con-
cerned that the speakers at court kept to the point. Each 
party had to swear the oath of relevance to speak to the 
"actual issue" (Ath. Pol. 67.1), and thejudges swore in the 
heliastic oath to cast their votes "about the matter to 
which the prosecution pertains" (Dem. 24.151). 
When looking for criteria for relevance, one must not 
rely on modern legal categories but, rather, on formal 
ones. Everything was relevant that a plaintiff had written 
in his statement of claim (enklbna) or a prosecutor in his 
accusation, as two examples might demonstrate. When 
Pantainetos in his charge for damages in a mining case 
had written at the end of his statement that the defendant 
maltreated heiresses (Dem. 37.33), the issue was "rele-
vant" and nobody could blame hirn for speaking about it. 
When Meletos added to his accusation of impiety that 
Socrates had corrupted the youth (D. L. 2.40), that fact 
was relevant, too, even if it was not legally connected with 
asebeia (pace Cohen, 1995, p. 189). It was notjuristiclogic, 
but simple practical considerations that constituted rele-
vance in Athenian courts. This formal view was a safe-
guard for fairness for the defendant (Thür, 2007). He 
should be aware of the main issues in the opponent's 
speech. In the same way, in the preparatory stage the liti-
gants had to reveal to each other the documents to be read 
aloud in court. To understand Athenian litigation, one 
must envisage that the two stages of trial procedure, the 
dialectical and the rhetorica!, formed a coherent, weil 
integrated unit. 
No special legal knowledge was necessary, therefore, to 
know what was a relevant issue. Nevertheless, it is unclear 
who made sure that the speakers kept to the point or what 
the sanctions were if they did not. The presiding magis-
trate is never said to have this function, and no other per-
son in court had authority. One can argue, however, that 
the anonymous mass of judges controlled the speakers' 
fairness. In theory, the Athenian dikastai, who had sworn 
to "listen impartially to both sides" (Dem. 24.151), played 
an absolutely passive role until each one secretly cast his 
vote. Before this., as no deliberation took place before the 
voting, no judge could express his individual opinion. 
From archaic times, however, an instrument of mass psy-
chology survived, thorybos (literally, "tumult," "uproar"; 
Bers, 1985). Confronted with an anonymous mass of 
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fellow citizens, in addition to presenting the ac tu al facts 
and legal arguments, either party did his best to make the 
judges weil disposed toward his case and toward hirnself, 
and hostile toward his opponent. The purpose of forensic 
rhetoric was to influence the audience. But during a 
speech, feelings run both ways, and the judges could com-
municate their reaction by means of thorybos. Good 
speakers made use of thorybos both positively and nega-
tively. In a positive sense, they asked the audience for 
shouts of agreements when calling on the judges them-
selves to be witnesses (Bers, 1985, p. 9) or when a sup-
porter (synegoros) was to be introduced (Rubinstein, 2000, 
p. 57). In a negative sense, speakers attempted to incite 
the audience to brand their opponents as "sycophants" 
(malicious prosecutors [Christ, 1998, p. 63]) or to per-
suade them to interrupt their opponents iE, for instance, 
they did not keep to the point (Dem. 21.130, 45.50; Bers, 
1985, p. 11) or if they omitted so me (allegedly) relevant 
argument or evidence. Even without such incitements 
every speaker must have known that shouts of disapproval 
might be raised if he went too far with a digression or 
personal invective. Arousing hostility could backfire, and 
the speaker always risked losing face. In the worst case, he 
could be (almost) completely shouted down (Dem. 45.6) . 
Thorybos as an instrument for controlling forensic rhet-
oric was a spontaneous expression of group sentiment. 
The presiding magistrate could only fine an individual 
member of the panel who constantly interrupted a speaker, 
but no examples of this are known. The judges' seats were 
distributed by lot precisely to prevent supporters of one 
party from manipulating thorybos deliberately. Finally, 
because court trials were open to the public, speakers also 
had to consider the reactions of the outside spectators or 
bystanders, the "coronal thorybos." Some speeches address 
them, too (Ant. 6.14, Lys. 27.2, Din. 1.30; Bers, 1985, p. 8). 
The interaction between the litigants, on the one hand, 
and the audience of average Athenian citizens, on the other, 
had important consequences on the style and substance of 
pleading at court. Every court speech had to uphold the 
values of democracy. In many public cases, members of the 
political elite struggled for their honor, status, and reputa-
tion in terms of values favored by the lower class sitting at 
court (Cohen, 1995, p. 193), but strictly within the formal 
and psychological framework of legal procedure as 
sketched in this article. In private cases, too, plaintiffs drew 
a picture of their own conformity to democratic values and 
their opponents disregard of these. Thus, because litigants 
pleaded within this democratic system of values, Athenian 
courts reproduced and reinforced group identities in their 
democratic society (Johnston, 1999, p. 132). 
[See also Courts, Ancient Greek, subentry on Courts and 
Magistrates in Ancient Athens; and Procedure, subentry 
on Athens: An Overview.] 
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